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Abstract	
Automated teller machines (ATMs) are central to the functioning of developed 
economies, but by their very nature operate without human supervision, making them 
vulnerable to criminal abuse. This study sought to understand how customers protect 
themselves from theft while using ATMs. Observations of and surveys with ATM 
customers were used to identify how individuals protect themselves from theft of cash, 
card or personal details while using an ATM. The most common self-guardianship 
measure was to use only ATMs believed to be safe. The majority of customers did not 
cover the ATM keypad while entering their personal identification number (PIN), 
despite long-running publicity campaigns encouraging this behaviour. This suggests 
that self guardianship is important at ATMs, but many customers fail to take even basic 
measures to protect themselves, their money and their bank details from theft. Banks 
and crime-prevention practitioners should do more to facilitate and encourage self 
guardianship at ATMs. 
Keywords. Automated teller machine, situational crime prevention, self 
guardianship 
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Introduction	
Automated teller machines (ATMs) were developed by banks in several countries in 
the late 1960s, allowing banks to reduce costs and giving customers access to a limited 
subset of banking services at any time of day (Bátiz-Lazo and Reid, 2011: 32). ATMs 
have become common, with more than two million in use worldwide in 2010 (PCISSC, 
2013: 8). In the United Kingdom (UK) 92% of adults used an ATM in 2009, performing 
a total of 2.9 billion transactions that provided 72% of all cash to individuals (Mott and 
Townsend, 2010: 2). ATMs are attractive to thieves because they provide a ready source 
of money at a time when the use of cash in other areas of society is declining. This 
study examined how people protect themselves while using an ATM, which is 
important because the “automated" nature of ATM transactions usually means there are 
no bank staff to protect customers.  
The routine-activities approach to studying crime (Cohen and Felson, 1979) 
understands criminal events in terms of opportunities, said to occur when a motivated 
offender and a suitable target converge in time and space. The likelihood of an 
opportunity resulting in a crime occurring depends upon the presence or absence of 
different actors who influence each element of the event. Offender handlers (Felson, 
1986) influence offender motivation, while place managers (Eck, 1995: 70) influence 
the likelihood of an offender and target meeting. The present study is concerned with 
the guardian, a third actor who influences the suitability of a target to attack. 
Individuals who provide guardianship are usually not specifically employed or trained 
to prevent crime, they are simply able to do so because of circumstance. The presence 
of passers-by can provide effective guardianship (Felson and Boba, 2010: 28), but only 
if members of the community look out for one another. Newman (1972: 79) argued that 
community members are more likely to act as guardians when they have “proprietary 
feelings" towards the target of a crime. This may well be the case in residential areas 
where neighbours know, and feel a responsibility to protect, one another – Reynald 
(2009) found that levels of guardianship were higher in areas with more social 
interaction between neighbours. ATMs are situated in such areas, but also in town 
centres, out-of-town shopping areas and other places where most people are not local, or 
are only occasional visitors. In such places, the ATM customer themselves may be the 
only person able to protect themselves. 
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There has been some disagreement in the literature about whether people can be 
guardians of themselves or their own property (Reynald, 2014: 2488) – what Sampson 
et al (2009: 46) referred to as “self guardianship". Hollis et al. (2013: 74) argued that 
only third parties can be guardians, and that self-protection should instead be referred to 
as target hardening. This term, however, has previously been used to refer specifically 
to strengthening the physical security of inanimate objects (see, for example Mayhew, 
1984; Clarke, 1997), which is only one type of guardianship activity. Sampson et al. 
(2009: 44), conversely, argued that “much guardianship is self-guardianship – people 
taking action to protect themselves”. This argument conceives of guardians as people 
who protect targets, whatever other roles they may have in a particular criminal act. The 
human elements described in the routine-activities model – offenders, targets, handlers, 
guardians, managers etc – are roles, rather than necessarily being separate actors. Eck 
and Madensen (2015) described how a single actor can fulfil multiple roles within the 
model. There appears to be no particular reason why a person can simultaneously be 
(for example) both a place manager and an offender handler but cannot simultaneously 
be a target and a guardian. The concept of self-guardianship appears to becoming 
increasing accepted in the literature and to be useful for analysis of criminal events (see, 
for example Franklin et al, 2012; Giblin, 2008; Reyns et al, 2011), and so will be used 
in this paper. 
The advantages of self guardianship are obvious: if people guard themselves then 
there will be as many guardians as targets, and each target will have a guardian 
constantly present. Nevertheless self-guardianship may be ineffective if the guardian is 
not capable, perhaps because they do not appreciate a particular risk of victimisation, 
have misunderstood it, or are physically incapable of guarding against an offender. 
Understanding the nature of self guardianship by potential victims is important for 
two reasons. Firstly, many crime-prevention activities (such as publicity campaigns and 
self-defence classes) are based on shaping or encouraging self guardianship. Such 
activities are more likely to be successful if those implementing them understand the 
existing level of baseline self guardianship. Secondly, other forms of crime prevention 
may be more likely to be effective if they take into account the nature of self-
guardianship carried out by potential victims. 
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ATMs are one of many innovations that have increased the usability of a product or 
service while also presenting new security challenges (Braz et al, 2007) – the 
“troublesome trade-off” between promoting use and avoiding abuse (Ekblom, 2005: 
217). In the case of ATMs, it is necessary for the bank to make access as easy as 
possible for customers while simultaneously preventing access by offenders.  
The frequency of ATM crime is not known, because in the UK police record 
offences according to the law broken rather than environmental characteristics. Attacks 
on ATM customers can be divided into two types: those that target the interface 
between the customer and the machine, and those that target the customer directly1. 
Human–machine interface attacks focus on obtaining details of a customer's bank card 
and personal identification number (PIN). Card details can be obtained by fitting a 
device to the card slot on the ATM, allowing the customer to insert a card but 
preventing the machine from returning it (Sakharova and Khan, 2011: 17). These card 
trap attacks are effective, but only one card can be captured before the offender must 
return to the machine (ENISA, 2009: 16). Since the customer's PIN is not recorded 
anywhere on a bank card (ISO, 2011: 13), card-trap offenders wishing to obtain the PIN 
must do so separately. One alternative is to instead place a cash trap over the slot 
through which the ATM dispenses cash, so that the customer cannot retrieve the cash 
but the offender can. 
A more efficient method is to fit a card skimmer over the ATM card slot. A skimmer 
can read the card number from the magnetic strip on the reverse of a bank card as the 
customer inserts the card into the machine (Masters and Turner, 2007). Skimmers are 
camouflaged to encourage customers to believe that they are a legitimate part of the 
ATM, and (because they allow the machine to return the customer's card) can typically 
collect details of many cards without detection (ENISA, 2009: 14). Some skimmers 
include a miniature camera that records video of the customer typing their PIN, or a 
false keypad fitted over the genuine keys. If the offender does not have access to a 
camera or replacement keypad, it will be necessary for them to obtain a customer's PIN 
by observing the customer typing it, typically by loitering close to the machine and 
watching the customer, known as shoulder surfing (ENISA, 2009: 17). 
Once an offender has obtained a card number, he or she can clone the card. If the 
offender also knows the relevant PIN, the card can be used at an ATM to withdraw 
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cash. Even without knowing the PIN, the offender can use the card number in 
transactions on the internet or over the telephone, known as card not present fraud 
(Kosse, 2013: 78). Offenders involved in stealing details from many cards can also sell 
those details in bulk to organised crime groups via specialist online forums (Europol, 
2012: 10).  
In addition to these attacks against the customer's card details, thieves can target cash 
– or the bank card itself – once a customer has removed it from the ATM. In many cases 
this is done by pick-pocketing, made easier for offenders because they can observe 
where the customer puts the money after using the ATM. Such offenders may seek to 
distract the customer, for example by spilling a drink onto their clothing or by one 
offender bumping into the customer while a second steals cash or card (Johnson et al, 
2010: 7). An alternative to pickpocketing is to use violence or threats to rob the 
customer. Such offences are not unique to ATMs, but robbing ATM customers may be 
attractive to thieves because the presence of the ATM ensures a steady flow of potential 
targets who are known to have cash in their possession (Holt and Spencer, 2005: 16). 
Although thefts from customers at ATMs have been a subject of previous research 
(e.g. Guerette and Clarke, 2003), little of this has focused on customer behaviour. Kosse 
(2013) reported on a survey of the perceptions of 1,672 Dutch citizens of the security of 
different methods of retail payment. Five percent of customers reported that they had 
previously been a victim of card skimming at an ATM. Ten percent reported feeling that 
using an ATM was unsafe, more than had the same feelings about using cash (2%), 
debit cards (4%) or credit cards (6%). Customers who felt ATMs were unsafe were 
more likely to prefer not using ATMs. 
The authors were able to find only one brief conference paper that attempted to 
answer similar questions to those being asked here. De Luca et al (2010) observed 
transactions at six ATMs in the Netherlands and Germany, then carried out a survey of 
25 customers in Switzerland. They found that 35% of customers made an observable 
attempt to cover the ATM keypad when entering their PIN, usually by holding their 
other hand or their wallet over the keypad. The proportion of customers actually 
covering their PIN was substantially lower than the 19 out of 25 participants who 
claimed that they always do so. Some participants stated that they normally cover their 
PIN, but would not do so if accompanied by a friend. Survey participants also 
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mentioned taking other security measures, such as only using ATMs in buildings or a 
familiar ATM, although the small sample size precluded extrapolation to the wider 
population. 
The present study was concerned with the theft of cash, bank cards, bank-card 
numbers or card PINs from customers while they were using an ATM or immediately 
afterwards. This included dishonest or fraudulent acquisition of a customer's card 
number, PIN or cash by shoulder surfing, distraction theft, pickpocketing or robbery, or 
by using a card skimmer, card trap, cash trap, covert camera or false keypad. Within this 
definition of ATM crime, the study attempted to answer two questions. 
1. How do people seek to protect themselves from becoming victims of theft 
related to their use of an ATM? 
2. How do any security measures that customers take differ depending on 
a. the age and gender of the customer, 
b. the environment the customer is in, and 
c. whether or not the customer has previously been a victim of ATM 
crime? 
Methods	
This study used observation of ATMs transactions combined with post-observation 
surveys with a sub-group of customers having conducted those transactions. A total of 
2,640 observations were carried out at 22 ATMs at ten sites in Camden and 
Westminster, two boroughs in central London. The sites selected were hot spots for 
ATM crime: i.e. those places with the highest number of personal robbery, theft from 
the person and deception offences recorded by police in the three years before the study 
began, with these offences being associated with an ATM if the offence address was 
recorded as being at, near or outside the relevant bank. All the ATMs observed were 
embedded into the external wall of a bank so as to be accessible to customers on the 
street – this is by far the most common type of ATM in the UK. 
All of the ATMs observed in this study are operated by the same bank, but the 
machines were not all of the same model or supplied by the same manufacturer. Retail 
banking in the UK is provided by a small number of large banks that operate across the 
country, and there are few differences between the customer-facing ATM operations of 
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the different banks. With a few exceptions, UK bank customers can (and often do) use 
ATMs operated by any bank without paying a charge, so the authors do not believe the 
decision to observe ATMs from one bank substantially limits the generality of the 
results. Both the bank operating the ATMs and the local police were made aware of the 
observations before they began. 
The ten study sites were observed for approximately 30 minutes a day, three days a 
week (Monday, Tuesday and Friday) for two periods of 8 weeks during the summer of 
2012. Every transaction occurring during an observation period was recorded. Since the 
observations were conducted over several weeks, some customers may have been 
observed more than once, but there was no way for the observers to identify such cases.  
To ensure that time of day, daylight levels and bank opening hours did not influence 
the results, every site was observed an equal number of times for each 30-minute period 
between 1100 and 2000. These times were chosen to ensure that there were sufficient 
transactions to observe. To maximise consistency of observations, observers were 
briefed before observations began, observations were recorded on a structured recording 
form and post-observation debriefs were conducted. Observers were stationed at pre-set 
points approximately ten metres from the nearest ATM (or group of ATMs), close 
enough that they could observe customers but far enough away that they were unlikely 
to influence customer behaviour. Observers were casually dressed and there were no 
incidents during the observations that indicated that customers were influenced by, or 
even aware of, the presence of observers. Observation locations were selected so that 
observers could gather data – including being able to see whether or not the customer 
covered their PIN – while not being close enough to be able to read the text on the ATM 
screen or see the PIN itself. PIN covering was recorded as it was seen by the observer, 
but it is possible that (for example) even though the observer believed the PIN to be 
covered, a person in another position could have been able to see the PIN. Observers 
were required to remain stationary so as not to influence customer behaviour and to 
ensure consistency of observations, so it was not possible for observers to make 
observations from multiple angles for each customer. 
For each ATM transaction, the observer recorded data about the customer and the 
environment surrounding them. The customer's age was estimated by the observer2. The 
emphasis placed on ensuring that the presence of observers did not influence the 
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behaviour of customers meant that the information that observers could record was 
limited. For example, it was not possible to record whether the observer checked for 
suspicious devices on the machine prior to using it, because many such checks would be 
done simply by looking at the machine so there would be no physical behaviour for the 
observer to see. 
During the final week of each eight-week observation period, observations were 
combined with surveys. During this period, after a customer had used an ATM they 
were approached by the observer and asked to complete a short survey (see Appendix 
A). A total of 276 customers agreed to participate in the survey, a response rate of 65% 
of those observed during the survey period. By approaching customers only after their 
ATM usage had been recorded by the observer, it was possible to ensure that observed 
behaviour was not influenced by the survey questions. 
An exploratory approach to analysis was used due to the nature of the research 
questions. Cramer's V (Cramer, 1946) was calculated for chi-squared (χ2) tests to 
quantify the association between variables. Values of V vary between zero – meaning 
no association between the two variables – and one – meaning complete association. 
Multivariate analysis was done using binary logistic regression. Note that because of 
multiple comparisons, readers should exercise caution in interpreting results that only 
just reach statistical significance. 
Results	
A total of 2,640 customers were observed using an ATM. At one site an observer 
witnessed a customer discovering – and bank staff subsequently removing – a card 
skimmer from an ATM. At another site, bank staff challenged an observer whom they 
had noticed loitering close to the ATMs. However, none of the customers who were 
observed challenged the observers directly. 
 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The third column of Table 1 shows the distribution of participants for each variable 
recorded by the observers, divided into variables relating to the customer, their 
behaviour and the environment around them. Forty-seven percent of customers 
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attempted to cover the ATM keypad when entering their PIN, of which 52% (24% of all 
customers) covered the keypad effectively so that the observer could not see the keypad. 
The remaining 48% of customers who attempted to cover the keypad (23% of all 
customers) did so ineffectively, such that the keypad was still visible to the observer and 
the PIN would still have been visible to the observer should they have been standing 
closer to the customer.  
The fourth column of Table 1 shows the proportion of customers attempting to cover 
their PIN according to each recorded variable. Table 2 shows the results of binary 
logistic regressions run to determine which individual and situational variables 
predicted whether or not a customer would attempt to cover their PIN. Further models 
were run with the location of the observation added as an additional predictor, but this 
did not lead to any significant change in the results. 
 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The PIN-covering model was significant (χ2(11) = 32.06, p < 0.01) but weak 
(Nagelkerke R2 = 0.02). Only two individual predictors were statistically significant: 
both the customer being aged 25–35 years (compared with being under 25 years) and 
the presence of people passing by were associated with fewer people attempting to 
cover their PIN.  
A total of 276 ATM customers took part in the survey, a mean of 28 per site. Two 
thirds of participants were male and all participants were aged under 50 years. 
Approximately one third of participants fell into each of three age groups: 24 years and 
under, 25–34 years and 35–49 years. Eight percent of participants had previously been a 
victim of ATM crime. 
Ninety percent of participants said that they were conscious of security when using 
ATMs. A logistic regression using age, gender and location of participants, and whether 
or not they had previously been a victim of ATM crime, showed that none of these 
variables were significant predictors of whether a person would be conscious of ATM 
security or not (χ2(12) = 11.06, p = 0.52, R2 = 0.09, co-efficient values available from 
authors on request). 
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[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Participants who said they were conscious of security were asked “what security 
issues are you conscious of?" with participants' responses coded for analysis and the 
results shown in the second column of Table 3. To determine whether the security 
issues of concern to participants varied according to their age, gender or location, a 
logistic regression was run with those variables as predictors. Since participants could 
report concern about more than one security issue, one regression was run for each 
issue. Table 3 shows that in no case were age, gender, location or previous victimisation 
significant predictors of whether or not a person would be concerned about a particular 
security issue. 
 
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Participants were then asked “How does concern about ATM security influence your 
behaviour when using an ATM?" This was an open question with participants' answers 
coded as shown in Table 4. Almost nine out of ten participants claimed that they took 
some action, regardless of their gender (χ2(1) = 0.21, p = 0.65, V = 0.03) or age (χ2(2) = 
2.68, p = 0.26, V = 0.10). There was no relationship between whether a person had 
previously been a victim of ATM crime and whether or not they claimed to take 
security measures (χ2(1) = 0.26, p = 0.61, V = 0.03). This may be due to the low number 
of victims in the survey and the high number of those claiming to take at least one 
security measure. Being conscious of ATM security was strongly associated with 
participants claiming to take action against perceived threats (χ2(2) = 169.50, p < 0.001, 
V = 0.78): 96% of people who said they were conscious of ATM security took steps to 
keep themselves safe while using an ATM, compared to 14% of people who were not 
conscious of security threats.  
The measures that participants described can be grouped into those concerning the 
choice of which ATM to use and those actions concerning how the participant uses that 
ATM. The most common measure in the first group, mentioned unprompted by over 
one quarter of participants, was to only use certain ATMs. To probe the factors 
influencing choice of ATM, participants were asked to choose from a list of potential 
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factors, as shown in Table 5. It seems that the appearance and location of an ATM are 
particularly important in customers' decisions. Also shown in Table 5 are the results of 
binary logistic regression models showing that in no case were the age, gender, location 
or previous-victimisation status of the participant a significant predictor of whether 
participants considered a particular factor or not. 
 
[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The most commonly stated security measures taken by participants after they had 
chosen an ATM were covering the keypad while entering their PIN (mentioned by 19% 
of participants), checking the machine for suspicious devices (mentioned by 18%) and 
checking the surrounding area (for example for suspicious people, mentioned by 12% of 
participants). 
After being asked what security measures they took without prompting, participants 
were asked whether or not they took the specific security measures shown in Table 6. It 
can be seen that the number of participants reporting taking a particular security 
measure in answer to the closed question was substantially higher than the number of 
participants who mentioned the same measure in their answers to the open question 
(shown in Table 4). 
 
[TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The final question asked “have you ever wanted to request privacy while using an 
ATM", to which 85% of respondents answered `yes'. Of those participants who wanted 
to request privacy, only 39% reported that they felt able to do so, with the remainder 
having wanted to ask for privacy but not having asked for it. Further logistic regressions 
showed that neither the proportion of people wanting privacy nor the proportion asking 
for it varied by age, gender, location or previous victimisation (wanting privacy: χ2(12) 
= 11.58, p = 0.48, R2 = 0.08; asked for privacy: χ2(12) = 13.88, p = 0.31, R2 = 0.09). 
Participants were surveyed after they had been observed using an ATM so that it was 
possible to compare their behaviour with their answers during the survey. Of the 90% of 
observed participants who claimed that they cover the ATM keypad when entering their 
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PIN, 74% were observed to attempt to do so: 53% actually covered the keypad, 
obscuring their PIN details, while a further 21% made an ineffective attempt to cover 
the keypad and 26% made no apparent attempt to do so. 
Discussion	
The survey conducted for the present study show that almost all ATM customers are 
concerned about security while using an ATM, regardless of their age, their gender or 
whether they have previously been a victim of ATM crime. Although taking 
preventative action appears to be dependent upon a customer being concerned about 
security, the vast majority of customers expressed such concern. Customers appear to be 
aware of a broad range of security threats, with participants mentioning all of the main 
types of customer-focused ATM crime discussed above. Concern about ATM security 
appears to be a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for taking steps to reduce the 
likelihood of victimisation. 
Almost all participants who were aware of ATM security threats claimed to take 
some action, again regardless of age, gender or previous victimisation. The most 
common action taken was to use only certain ATMs, particularly those believed to be 
safe due to their surroundings and or conditions. This finding may be of interest to 
banks because in the UK a bank receives a fee whenever one of their ATMs is used by a 
customer of another bank, and so banks have an incentive to make their own ATMs as 
attractive as possible. Banks wishing to maximise ATM usage may benefit from 
publicising the security features of their own ATMs, particularly in inner cities where 
there are many bank branches and customers can easily choose between ATMs operated 
by different banks. 
Participants' stated preference for ATMs in areas that appear to be safe and familiar 
suggests that customers seek out environments where natural surveillance, either by 
passers-by or by the customer themselves, is most likely to be effective. Given that 
ATMs are often situated in non-residential areas, customers may be searching for a site 
that replicates, to the extent possible, the natural surveillance that protects them when 
they are in their own neighbourhood. 
While almost all participants stated that concern about ATM security caused them to 
take action to protect themselves, it is notable that most customers did not cover their 
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PIN. A secure PIN is the primary means by which banks ensure that a person using an 
ATM is authorised to have access to a particular bank account, so banks in many 
countries have for several years run campaigns encouraging customers to cover their 
PIN when using an ATM. All of the ATMs observed in the present study featured an 
on-screen message reminding customers to cover their PIN. Despite this timely 
reminder, most customers did not attempt to cover their PIN and almost half of those 
who did were ineffective in hiding the PIN from observers. 
A review by Barthe (2006) found that crime-prevention advice was more likely to be 
effective at reducing crime if it was specific to a particular type of crime and was 
provided so that it was timely and relevant to potential victims. In this respect, the 
banks appear to be doing everything correctly: the advice given is specific to ATM 
crime, and it is both timely and relevant. The high proportion of customers not covering 
their PIN may therefore indicate either that the content of the advice given is 
ineffective, or that there is a general limitation on the effectiveness of victim-focused 
crime-prevention publicity in this context. Further research to test the impact of varying 
the content of on-screen PIN-covering reminders, or development and testing of other 
measures to do so, may therefore be beneficial in helping banks to increase the 
proportion of customers covering their PIN. 
The regression models run to determine whether individual and environmental 
variables predicted whether a customer would cover their PIN suggested that customers 
either use these protective measures or they do not, largely regardless of circumstance. 
This may be a positive result for crime-prevention practitioners: it suggests that if a 
customer can be convinced to either cover their PIN, they may begin to do so habitually. 
The notable exception to the apparent lack of influence of environmental variables was 
that people were less likely to cover their PIN if there were people passing by. This may 
suggest that when there are other potential guardians present, people feel that there is 
less need to guard themselves. 
It may be possible to change the design of ATMs to encourage self-guardianship. 
The concept of “affordances” (Norman, 1999) – “what [the design of] an object `invites' 
the actor to do" (Farrell and Pease, 2008: 119) – may be useful in designing an ATM 
that encourages users to behave in a way that promotes their security. For example, the 
physical design of the ATM keypad could be adapted to `invite' users to cover their 
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PIN. Doing so may be more successful than simply placing a notice on the ATM 
encouraging PIN covering (for further discussion of affordances and crime, see Pease, 
2006). 
Perhaps the most fruitful potential SCP technique for ATM security concerns the 
siting of ATMs and the design of the surrounding environment. The results of the 
present study show that customers prefer ATMs that are in secure and/or busy areas, 
and that appear clean, new or `safe'. Many ATMs are sited in places in which the ATM 
is peripheral to the main purpose of the facility, for example where they are provided in 
public transport stations or shopping centres. The secondary nature of the ATM function 
(from the point of view of the facility owner) is often reflected in placement of ATMs 
away from the busiest areas, possibly because space in busy areas is at a premium and 
the owner chooses to use it for their core business. This leads to ATMs being placed in 
hallways, adjacent to public toilets, in car parks and in other out-of-the-way areas. 
Placing ATMs in central positions may facilitate customers' self-guardianship and 
encourage more people to use such machines. Increased ATM use would provide banks 
with additional usage fees, which may offset any additional money banks would be 
required to pay to secure premium space (although the economics may vary from case 
to case). 
The data collection methods used in the present study were designed to make the 
results applicable to customers' use of ATMs in a busy inner-city environment. All of 
the ATMs observed were on busy streets surrounded primarily by shops and offices. 
This is a common environment in which ATMs are found in the UK, but the 
observation results may not be generalisable to the behaviour of customers using ATMs 
in different environments, such as outside rural bank branches or out-of-town shopping 
centres. 
Survey respondents were selected from customers using the ATMs under 
observation. As such the results may not necessarily be reflective of the wider inner-city 
population or of people in other environments. This is important because choosing 
ATM customers for survey will mean that the results will not capture responses from 
any potential customers who are so concerned about security that they do not use ATMs 
at all. All observations and surveys were conducted between 1100 and 2000 hours, so 
the results may not be generalisable to other times of day. Research covering rural 
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locations or other times of day would have been problematic, because the lower rate of 
ATM use would have meant longer observations at greater cost, and would have made it 
difficult for the observers to have remained unnoticed. 
There were substantial differences between the proportion of survey participants who 
claimed to take security measures (particularly PIN covering) and the proportion 
actually observed to have done so. This was not unexpected, since the long-standing 
advice from banks to cover PINs may have led some participants to claim they took 
certain measures because they believe that doing so is expected of them, rather than 
because they actually take such action (for a discussion of social-desirability bias in 
criminological research, see Sutton and Farrall, 2005). 
The results of this study suggest several potentially useful avenues for future 
research. The present study has provided evidence that many ATM customers do not 
cover their PINs – it would be useful for crime-prevention practitioners to know why 
this is. A simple survey would be likely to suffer from the social-desirability bias 
mentioned above, but this problem could be overcome using a post-observation survey 
with questions tailored to whether the participant had been seen to cover their PIN or 
not. The results of that research could be used to design measures to encourage PIN 
covering, which could be evaluated for their effectiveness. It would also be valuable to 
investigate the interactions between different protective measures. For example, do 
customers choose not to cover their PIN because they have already selected an ATM 
they believe to be safe? Such research would require a larger survey sample than was 
available here. Finally, it may be a useful contribution to the research on guardianship 
to determine whether the finding that ATM customers were less likely to cover their 
PIN in the presence of other people might be because they felt that those people 
provided them with additional guardianship. 
The results of the present study indicate that ATM customers are both concerned 
about becoming a victim of theft and take steps to reduce that risk. The most common 
step taken is to use only ATMs that are in environments that provide natural 
surveillance, followed by covering the keypad while entering a PIN. Nevertheless, 
despite extensive publicity campaigns by banks encouraging various ways in which 
customers can protect themselves at ATMs, only around half of users take even basic 
measures such as PIN covering. These results suggest that – in the absence of formal 
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surveillance or place managers at most ATMs – banks should do more to encourage and 
facilitate customers to protect themselves. 
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Notes	
1 It is also possible to attack the machine directly, or to attack bank staff servicing a 
machine, but such attacks are outside the scope of the present study. 
2 Ages were subsequently categorised and – for people who were observed and 
subsequently surveyed – compared with the ages given by participants during the 
survey. Eighty-three percent of ages estimated by observers were in the same age 
category as given by the survey respondents. 
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Table 1: Customer characteristics and protective behaviours (n=2,640) 
  customers 
(%) 
customers 
attempting to 
cover pin (%) 
all customers all values 100 47 
customer 
apparent age <25 years 27 52 
25–34 years 37 44 
35–49 years 28 48 
>=50 years 8 45 
apparent sex female 40 48 
male 60 47 
customer behaviour 
smoking yes 12 45 
no 89 47 
using mobile phone yes 5 54 
no 95 47 
carrying bag in hand 27 44 
on shoulder 18 57 
on floor 5 47 
>1 bags 8 48 
no bags 43 45 
accompanied yes 8 53 
no 92 47 
environment 
passers by yes 73 46 
no 27 51 
queue at ATM yes 37 50 
no 63 46 
people standing close to 
ATM 
yes 9 45 
no 91 48 
another person in position to yes 2 33 
21	
see keypad no 98 48 
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Table	2:	Predictors	of	PIN	covering	
 
Dependent variables: PIN covering  
Independent variables odds ratio S.E.  
aged 25–34 years† 0.67*** 0.11  
aged 35–49 years† 0.89 0.12  
aged 50 years or older† 0.72 0.18  
male 0.94 0.09  
smoking 0.9 0.14  
using mobile phone 1.34 0.2  
carrying a bag in their hand 0.83 0.1  
accompanied 1.26 0.17  
people passing by 0.78* 0.1  
queue at ATM 1.13 0  
people standing near to ATM 0.96 0.17  
other person could see ATM keypad 0.62 0.32  
constant 1.36* 0.14  
 
* p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001  †compared to customer under 25 years 
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Table	 3:	 Relationship	 between	 age,	 gender	 and	 location	 versus	 concern	 about	
security	risks	
Table shows logistic regression results, with R2 calculated using method proposed by 
Nagelkerke (1991). Co-efficient for individual predictors available from authors on 
request. 
security issue 
Participants 
(n=276) 
concerned about 
this issue (%) χ2 d.f. p R2 
shoulder surfing 34 8.48 12 0.75 0.05 
skimming 29 11.23 12 0.51 0.07 
personal 
theft/robbery 
20 8.11 12 0.78 0.05 
card or cash trap  18 10.53 12 0.57 0.07 
other 19 20.3 12 0.06 0.13 
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Table 4: How does concern about ATM security influence your behaviour 
when using an ATM? (n = 236)	
Security measure Participants stating 
they take this measure 
(%) 
ATM selection 
Only use ATM that is ...  28 
 in branch/secure area 8 
 in a busy area 8 
 clean, new or ‘safe’ 7 
 familiar to customer 5 
Minimise ATM use 9 
Avoid ATMs at 
weekends 
 1 
ATM use 
Cover PIN 19 
Check ATM before use 18 
Look for suspicious people 8 
‘Be suspicious’ 7 
Look around or check area 6 
Look over shoulder 3 
Avoid interacting with other people 3 
Other 7 
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Table	5:	What	factors	do	you	consider	when	choosing	an	ATM	to	use?	(n	=	274)	
Each model attempted to predict behaviour based on age, gender, previous 
victimisation and interview location – in no case were the results significant. Table 
shows logistic regression results, with R2 calculated using method proposed by 
Nagelkerke (1991). 
security issue 
Participant
s 
considerin
g this 
factor χ2 d.f. p R2 
well-maintained ATM 73% 8.11 12 0.78 0.05 
ATM in particular 
place 55% 10.53 12 0.57 0.07 
ATM in busy area 52% 11.23 12 0.51 0.07 
ATM in well-lit area 21% 8.48 12 0.75 0.05 
particular brand of 
ATM 5% 20.3 12 0.06 0.13 
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Table 6: Which of the following security measures do you take when 
using an ATM? (n = 273)	
Security measure 
Participants stating 
they take this measure 
(%) 
Covering ATM keypad when entering 
PIN 90 
Checking ATM for suspicious devices 63 
Checking that no one is standing close 
by 42 
Checking over shoulder 40 
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Appendix A: survey questions 
1. Are you conscious of security when using an ATM? 
2. What security issues are you conscious of? 
3. How does concern about ATM security influence your behaviour when using 
an ATM? 
4. Have you been a victim of ATM crime? 
5. Can you describe to me what happened when you were a victim of ATM 
crime? 
6. Do you: 
a. cover your PIN? 
b. ensure no-one is in your personal space before using the ATM? 
c. request privacy when using the ATM? 
7. What is the most important factor to you in deciding to use an ATM? 
8. What is the most important factor to you when using an ATM? 
9. Have you ever wanted to request privacy while using an ATM? 
